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Resumen
La neurofilosofía se presenta en los albores del siglo xxi como una rama de la neurociencia. En 
este artículo nos proponemos hacer una revisión crítica de algunos debates epistemológicos y antro-
pológicos que la neurofilosofía ha traído nuevamente a colación. Para este análisis se tomará como hilo 
conductor las investigaciones filosóficas que se vienen realizando desde la Cátedra unesco de Filosofía 
para la Paz. El texto se organiza en dos partes, una primera de carácter epistemológico y la segunda de 
perfil antropológico. Todo ello nos conducirá a cuestionar algunos de los avances significativos que la 
neurofilosofía puede plantear para una mejor comprensión del ser humano.
Palabras clave: Neurofilosofía, Filosofía para la Paz, Epistemología, Antropología, Conflictos.
Abstract
Neurophilosophy appeared at the dawn of the twenty-first century as a branch of neurosciences. 
The aim of this article is to review critically some of the epistemological and anthropological debates 
that neurophilosophy has brought forth. In order to do so, the philosophical research conducted by 
the unesco Chair of Philosophy for Peace will be used as the main thread of the analysis. To accom-
plish this critical review, the article has been organized into two parts: the first is of epistemological 
nature, and the second has an anthropological perspective. This analysis will lead us to question the 
significance of the contributions of neurophilosophy to a better understanding of the human being.
Keywords: Neurophilosophy, Philosophy for Peace, Epistemology, Anthropology, Conflict.
1  This study is a part of  the Scientific Research and Technological Development Project FFI2010-21639-C02-02 
entitled “Aportación de la neuroeconomía a la dimensión ética del diseño institucional” (Contribution of  
neuroeconomics to the ethical dimension of  institutional design) funded by the Ministry of  Education and 
Science and also with European Union ERDF funds.
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Introduction
Neuroscience emerges at the beginning of the twenty-first century as a new 
discipline capable of making important contributions not only to the natural sci-
ences but also—and here is where the critical focus of this article lies—to the 
social and human sciences, and, more specifically, to the thoughts on practical rea-
son, by way of what is known as neurophilosophy or neuroethics. Regarding the latter, 
some recent lines of research have even suggested the possibility of discovering 
the neural bases of universal ethics or the possibility of unravelling and reveal-
ing the workings of free will.2 This paper presents a critical view of the potential 
contributions of neuroscience both to the understanding of critical thinking and 
to its construction. This critical analysis will draw on the proposals the research 
group of the unesco Chair of Philosophy for Peace has been developing in recent 
years at the Universitat Jaume I (Martínez Guzmán, 2001; 2005a) centred on vari-
ous topics of discussion, namely the epistemological status of social and human 
sciences, the debate between nature and culture—a long-standing debate of Peace 
Research—, and the relationship between culture and conflict. These discussions 
are developed in the two sections of this paper: the first one deals with these is-
sues from an epistemological point of view, and the second one from the perspec-
tive of anthropology.
It is important to note that neuroethics has two distinct lines of work that are 
known as the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics (Roskies, 2002: 21; Cor-
tina, 2010a). The first line of work, the ethics of neuroscience, addresses the emi-
nently practical level of the ethical criteria for the application of neuroscience, both 
in the doctor-patient relationship and in its use with experimental subjects, as well 
as the impact it may have on the general public, through the introduction of new 
techniques such as neuromarketing or neuropolitics, among others. The second line of 
research, the neuroscience of ethics, works on a more theoretical level, considering 
questions such as human behaviour and the nature of the human being. Therefore, 
we could say that the problems of neuroethics can be divided, on the one hand, 
into ethical issues which arise from the general practice of neuroscience and are in 
theory shared by many biological disciplines, and, on the other hand, into a category 
of questions which address the more nuclear dimensions of neural science, having 
a direct impact on our identity, our freedom, and our actions (Giménez Amaya and 
Sánchez-Migallón, 2010: 103); in other words, the different aspects of neuroeth-
ics, not only as applied ethics, but also as fundamental ethics (Cortina, 2010b). In 
2  The scientific journal Nature devotes one of  its monographs to this subject. The article, sensationalistically entitled 
“Neuroscience vs philosophy: Taking aim at free will”, questions whether the rules that apply to the almost 
automated actions that take place in the laboratory have anything to do with what actually happens in the complex 
and socially mediated world of  real-life choices.
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recent years, the neurosciences have raised the question of what we are and who 
we are, thus penetrating the deepest and most intimate layers of the human being, 
and providing a scientific view of humankind, which is often almost incompatible 
with philosophical proposals. This second line of work, the neuroscience of ethics 
or neurophilosophy, will be the main focus of our critical review.
1. Neurophilosophy: an Epistemological Review
Since the last decade of the twentieth century we have been witnessing the 
emergence of a new family of disciplines with the prefix “neuro” as their kin-
ship mark. This has produced the configuration of a new “neuro-terminology” 
(Mora, 2007: 26) which has been applied to classical humanity disciplines such 
as philosophy, ethics, sociology, art, economics, or theology itself. These new 
neuro-disciplines have met mixed and opposing reactions from the scientific com-
munity, among which we find a varied range of viewpoints, from those who think 
it is a mere fad incapable of contributing anything that could change the essence 
of the classic conception of humanism3—and which may even be misleading—, 
to those who believe the neuro-disciplines can contribute innovative knowledge 
to humanities. It is interesting to note that the first group is composed mainly of 
authors working in the field of social and human sciences, and the second group 
is formed by authors from the natural sciences. Amongst this wide range of views, 
there are some authors who recognize the contributions of the neuro-disciplines 
to the understanding of the human being, and others who, from the perspective 
of the natural sciences, recognize that, despite its recent advances, neuroscience is 
still in its infancy and has not yet managed to understand in depth the functioning 
of the brain (Mora, 2007: 17).
One of these new neuro-disciplines is neurophilosophy. Despite its name, more 
theorising has been carried out in this discipline by scientists—i.e. biologists, physi-
cians, neuroscientists—,than by philosophers themselves. These scientists debated 
whether neuroscience could eventually, somehow and someday, replace philosophy 
itself. Patricia Churchland, who first coined the term neurophilosophy in her book 
Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (1990), responded to this 
debate with a resounding no, by indicating that philosophy had the best slice of the 
cake left, in the sense that philosophy was the quintessence, the perfect place to syn-
thesize results and integrate theories coming from different territories, because of its 
panoramic vision and its inclusive embrace (Mora, 2007: 47). Therefore, it appears 
3  Authors such as Lehrer (2010) defend the view that neuroscientists are not discovering anything new, but believe 
that the findings neuroscientists present are simply conceptions of  the human being which philosophers, poets, 
writers, or artists had already reached by other means.
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that, from the point of view of neurophilosophy, the function of philosophy would 
be reduced to that of synthesis. But what of the critical function of philosophy? 
Questioning appearances, casting a critical eye over the assumptions at the heart of 
our society, our culture, and our science is an essential task philosophy cannot, and 
should not, delegate.
A similar point could be made about neuroethics, a discipline in which the bio-
logical bases of values  and moral judgments are researched and emphasized. While 
this is an interesting perspective in so much as it allows us to break away from the 
excessive social constructionism that has traditionally characterised these disci-
plines, we should not allow ourselves to be over-influenced by the other extreme 
and ignore the impact of social interaction and of the context. Some authors present 
the dilemma as follows: the morals and the standards derived from moral reasoning 
come either from God or from human beings themselves, from their own biology 
(Mora, 2007: 66). Where would this leave social interaction, intersubjectivity? Biol-
ogy would reduce it to an incidental, almost collateral, type of interaction. Other 
authors take a more cautious approach and note that the brain is an open system 
which is permanently changing and constantly interacting with its social environ-
ment (Mora, 2007: 157); therefore, it cannot be considered deterministic, compared 
to the degree of predictability of other elements of nature.
Most neuroscientists come from the field of experimental psychology, biology 
or medicine, that is to say, they belong to the sphere of what is commonly known 
as the natural sciences. The introduction of a new cycle of thinking that can help 
us improve our view of the world and of ourselves, more finely tuned to our 
biological nature (Mora, 2007: 31) is definitely of interest. However, as we noted 
earlier in this article, in recent years neuroscientists have come to argue, defend 
and/or challenge theories which had long been held or debated by philosophers 
and humanists. Had it come from the opposite side, this audacity would never have 
been tolerated. Would it not be appropriate for neuroscientists to acknowledge 
at this point the historical and cognitive background, and the peculiarities of the 
methodology and object of study of social and human sciences? Neuroscientists 
are increasingly requiring philosophers and humanists to master and apply the 
knowledge and the latest findings of natural sciences. Would it not be appropriate 
to request from neuroscientists the gesture of humility and the scientific rigour of 
acquiring a greater knowledge of human sciences before daring to make certain 
unwarranted assertions? 
Natural sciences, from which neurosciences cannot be dissociated, no matter 
how many humanistic labels are sought, are based upon and use a reductionist ap-
proach, drawn from the model of modern Western science of Galilean tradition 
used by the natural sciences, which is based on mathematization and experimenta-
tion. In the nineteenth century, when social and human sciences were recognized 
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as explicit sciences, a debate on the epistemological or scientific status of these 
sciences began. This debate was mainly in relation to its methodological monism 
or dualism, in other words, whether we need to use a different model of science 
for the social and human sciences, or we can continue using the same model the 
natural sciences have been employing since the late Renaissance and Baroque period 
(Von Wright, 1980: 20). A long tradition of scientific thought, with which we agree, 
considers that humanities and social sciences should follow a different model of 
science, of Aristotelian tradition and based on the concept of understanding; a model 
which takes into account the uniqueness of the object of study, the human being, 
and its methodological implications.
Neuroscientists have disregarded this debate, clearly taking a scientific concep-
tion of methodological monism as their starting point, and using it to transfer their 
physiological findings of the human being to a more holistic understanding of the 
feelings, thoughts and behaviour of the human being. For many neuroscientists, 
their discipline is the bridge capable of covering the existing gap between science 
and humanities (Mora, 2007: 15, 24). It has even been defined as a discipline in 
which the two great universes of knowledge, science and humanities, converge 
(Mora, 2007: 16). However, the use of an essentially reductionist method, the Gali-
lean tradition, for the analysis of an essentially complex reality such as the human 
being, will lead to understandings of the human being, and of the world and the life 
of the human species, which will not be holistic, but unavoidably partial. 
On the other hand, the use of moral dilemmas as a tool for work and analysis is 
not exempt from controversy. Adela Cortina, as well as other experts, questions the 
validity of dilemmas as key for moral interpretation (Cortina, 2010a: 144). According 
to Jesús Conill (2006 in Cortina, 2010a: 144), moral life does not consist in facing di-
lemmas, but in projecting a good life; the experiential richness of human life cannot be 
straitjacketed by dilemmas. Marc Hauser (2008), like other neuroscientists, bases his 
studies on the analysis of moral dilemmas. However, we cannot ignore the problems 
entailed in this approach, since solving hypothetical moral dilemmas is not the same 
as dealing with them in real life, something Carol Gilligan (1986) had already stated 
in her classic debate with Kohlberg. Other neuroscientists, among them Hauser 
(2008: 61-62), have argued against the criticism that hypothetical dilemmas are arti-
ficial, detached from everyday experience, and designed only for ivory tower dwell-
ers. According to Hauser, by using artificiality and avoiding any kind of familiarity, 
we prevent judgments based on pure emotions; we eliminate bias and guarantee 
impartiality. Hauser tries thus to justify the use of hypothetical dilemmas, although 
he does say that only by examining artificial examples alongside real-life cases will 
important aspects of the nature of our judgements be discovered (2008: 62).
Besides disregarding the body of knowledge of social and human sciences, neu-
roscientists base their research on an epistemological approach which is exclusive 
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in another sense: they are markedly ethnocentric. They hardly take cultural diversity 
into account in their methodology or in their aims. Neuroscientists focus their 
analyses, above all on the world of experience of Western culture, disregarding that 
of any other culture. And this can be observed in two aspects: a. In the methodology. 
The hypothetical dilemmas raised have a distinctly Western character. The individu-
als on whom studies and experiments are performed live in the Western world. 
b. In the priorities of their object of study. Problems associated with longevity—such as 
Alzheimer—or with depression, for example, are typical of the affluent societies of 
the wealthy Northern countries. Unfortunately, in most parts of the world these 
problems are not priority concerns. It should not be forgotten that, according to 
the United Nations Development Program, 80% of the world population survives 
on 20% of the planet’s resources, while 20% of the population of the enriched 
countries enjoys 80% of these resources.
According to Javier San Martín (2012), human sciences have natural sciences 
among their objects of study: they study their history, their establishment, their influ-
ence on society, on history and on the lives of individuals. However, what is most 
studied, especially in the case of philosophy, is their rules and structure as knowledge 
disciplines. A very interesting contribution of Javier San Martín is his acknowledge-
ment of the unavoidable dependence of natural sciences on human sciences, as the 
latter are responsible for revealing the goals of life, our possibilities, and the ration-
ality of our objectives (San Martín, 2012). We can question, for example, if neuro-
science is really capable of giving answers to the main challenges humanity will be 
facing in the twenty-first century, or if it is simply allowing itself to be over- zealous 
because of recent technical findings that have occurred in its field of study. While our 
telescopes and microscopes are carefully scrutinizing the mysteries of the universe 
and of life itself, we are facing the destruction of life to extremes never seen before 
in written history (Macy, 2003: 117). Returning to Husserl’s concept of the life-world, 
Giménez Amaya and Sanchez-Migallón point out that philosophy needs to develop a 
more satisfying theory of human praxis for the new experimental sciences.
 
La Ciencia crea y sólo se mueve entre símbolos, y sólo el mundo de la vida, el 
mundo precientífico, puede ser su última confirmación. Cuando la Ciencia se erige 
en un conocimiento que está sobre el conocimiento intuitivo precientífico, cuando 
el positivismo científico aparta su vista de la Historia olvida que sus símbolos son 
sólo símbolos y entonces nunca llegan a confirmarse (Giménez Amaya and Sánchez-
Migallón, 2010: 149).4
4  “Science can only create and move by means of  symbols, and only the world of  life, the pre-scientific world, can 
be its ultimate confirmation. When science proclaims itself  superior to intuitive pre-scientific knowledge, when 
scientific positivism looks away from history, it forgets its symbols are nothing but symbols, never receiving 
confirmation”.
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Much science, overlooking its original partiality, has claimed to be the only valid 
universal knowledge, in spite of being vaguely aware of its relative provisionality 
(Giménez Amaya and Sánchez-Migallón, 2010: 152). The instrumentalization of sci-
ence made it possible to believe that everything in nature, including human beings, 
could be manipulated. The excesses of technical rationality make us forget that the 
human being is essentially and existentially a biographical being, a being who builds 
his history, his personality, by means of a narrative (Giménez Amaya and Sánchez-
Migallón, 2010: 159). Experimental science is currently undergoing a very profound 
crisis, not only because of the questions it is asking itself, but also of the fact that 
it is questioning itself as discipline and as human activity. This crisis has been even 
more patent in neuroscience on account of its theoretical and practical implications. 
This is precisely what has made neuroethics and its approach necessary.
It is curious how humanistic and scientific disciplines can converge producing 
similar results.5 Interestingly enough, in his latest book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, psy-
chologist Daniel Kahneman identifies the neural bases that demonstrate the need 
for unhurried thought in order to avoid making cognitive errors which could have 
moral consequences. The discussion about the importance of time is not new to 
the human sciences. We could say both are ways of attempting to understand the 
human being: while scientists dissect ideas into their different components, artists 
and philosophers, in turn, propose an understanding of consciousness from within. 
Our truth, they said, must originate from ourselves, from the way we feel reality 
(Lehrer, 2010: 16). This relates to the way Ortega y Gasset differentiated social and 
human sciences from natural sciences, by way of the division between biographical 
and biological life (San Martín, 2012). Any description of the brain requires both cul-
tures: art and science. The reductionist methods of science must go hand in hand 
with an artistic research into our experience (Lehrer, 2010: 19).
We owe C.P. Snow the theory of the “two cultures”, which describes the phe-
nomenon whereby art and science suffer from a mutual misunderstanding. Our 
knowledge could be described as a collection of solitary chiefdoms, each with its 
own customs and vocabulary. According to Snow, the solution to this epistemic 
schism was the creation of a “third culture” that could bridge the communication 
gap between scientists and artists. All would benefit from a better understanding 
of the other. Snow turned out to be a prophet, at least partially. The third culture 
is now an authentic cultural movement. However, although this new culture bears 
the same name as the concept defined by Snow, it is actually very different from his 
project. Instead of referring to a space for dialogue between artists and scientists—a 
shared cultural space, so to speak—, the third culture of today has to do with the 
direct communication of scientists with the general public, to scientists’ interest in 
5  This is the main thesis of  the book Proust Was a Neuroscientist (Lehrer, 2010), which shows how some artists, 
writers, painters and composers, were ahead of  the discoveries of  neuroscience.
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translating their truths into the language of the masses (Lehrer, 2010: 223-224). This 
is clearly important and necessary, but it presents several limitations (2010: 224). 1) 
It has not managed to eliminate the dividing line between our two main cultures. 
A real dialogue between equals is still not in place. 2) The positions defended by 
the thinkers of the “third culture” are often based on a one-dimensional view of 
the scientific enterprise and its relationship with humanities. Therefore, statements 
claiming for instance that the “lack of empiricism” of humanities has to be correct-
ed by reductionist science are not uncommon. Unfortunately, many of the brightest 
minds of our third culture are clearly opposed to anything which is not scientific 
(Lehrer, 2010: 225).
The contributions of neuroscience to the building of knowledge on some funda-
mental aspects of the human being should not be disregarded. However, for these 
contributions to be successful—both from an epistemological and from an ethical 
point of view—, they must establish an interdisciplinary dialogue with the other 
social and human sciences. Several authors emphasize the importance of attaining 
this deep interdisciplinary dialogue (Cortina, 2011; Giménez Amaya and Sánchez-
Migallón, 2010: 167). In this respect, the epistemological turn the UNESCO Chair of 
Philosophy for Peace has been working on can provide us with some useful material 
for thought (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 114-116). Here are some of the fundamental 
axes of this epistemological turn: 1. Intersubjectivity, interdisciplinarity and mutual 
interpellation, versus objectivity. 2. The assumption of an epistemology committed 
to values. 3. Overcoming the dichotomy between nature and culture, acknowledging 
the social construction of nature within a continuum.
 
2. Neurophilosophy: an Anthropological Review
As discussed in the previous section, neuroscience needs to revise some aspects 
of its fundamentals and methodology before continuing to make assumptions with 
the hope of changing or modifying the understanding of the human being (Lavazza 
and De Caro, 2009). In this section we will discuss some of the contributions of 
neurophilosophy to the knowledge of the human being, as well as some of its biases. 
To perform this analysis, we will firstly focus on the relationship between nature 
and culture, and secondly on the relationship between culture and conflict.
 
2.1. Nature and Culture
A noteworthy contribution of neuroscience to the understanding of the human 
being is the recovery of the biological-natural dimension, which too often had been 
overlooked in the history of Western thought, as Steven Pinker points out in his 
seminal work The Blank Slate. The Modern Denial of Human Nature (2003).
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Indeed, if we think of the history of human beings as a species, we observe 
that the phylogenetic, instinctual and emotional mechanisms were in charge of 
taking decisions which were vital for us, and only a small part of the conflicts 
we faced were rationally controlled and managed. Freedom and free will, in the 
context of the evolutionary process, were only limited capacities. This is why José 
Manuel Martín Morillas (2003; Martín Morillas and Muñoz, 2007: 31-51) suggests 
the concept of the agonising rationality, which focuses precisely on the study of 
these circumstances, as rationality cannot control all circumstances that affect the 
lives of human beings, and will probably never be able to control them.
El resultado final es un ser humano en cierto sentido “roto” por las condiciones de 
su propia evolución, por su historia y por las interpretaciones que ha alcanzado a 
hacer de sí mismo. Esta ruptura podría ser reflejo, asimismo, de su doble condición 
homo y sapiens, ser vivo y ser cultural (Muñoz y Jiménez Arenas, 2012: 62).6
 
At the unesco Chair of Philosophy for Peace we have been vindicating the im-
portance of recovering the etymological sense of “human” (homo-humus: ground, 
earth) which reminds us of our natural, earthly dimension. This earthliness has 
to do with the physical and biological conditions of our existence, it implies an 
assumption of humility (a term also related to homo-humus), and it is also an expres-
sion of our own frailty (Martínez Guzmán, 2005b).
However, one thing is giving back to the biological-natural dimension the 
weight it deserves in the understanding of the human being, and another quite 
different is falling into a naturalistic reductionism which is bent on ignoring the 
rich social complexity of the world and how it can make human beings avoid 
and/or adjust their biological underpinnings. Similarly to how phrenologists 
were determined to reduce the analysis of human nature to the shape of the skull, 
neurologists seem determined to reduce it to the functioning of neurons.
As we mentioned earlier, the natural sciences are characterized by their reduc-
tionism, while human beings are characterized by complexity. Thus, for instance, 
feelings are only experienced as a conscious whole, and not as a sum of separate 
feelings; dissecting emotions the way science dissects its objects of study would 
only make them unreal. For the psychologist William James who criticised the 
reductionism into which psychology was already drifting at the end of the nine-
teenth century, the true contents of our minds are always representations of some 
kind of whole (Lehrer, 2010: 40).
6  “The final result is a human being who is, in a way, ‘broken’ by the conditions of  his own evolution, by his history 
and by the interpretations he has made of  himself. This rupture could also be a reflection of  his dual nature of  
homo and sapiens, of  living being and cultural being”.
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As Walt Whitman said, no matter how much we know about our physical 
anatomy, the ineffable will always remain ineffable (Lehrer, 2010: 44).7 If science 
could see freedom, what would it look like? And if it wanted to find will, where 
would it look? (Lehrer, 2010: 62). Neuroscience seems determined to recuperate 
a positivist scientific vision, which many of us thought obsolete. Similarly to how 
an astronomer can predict the future movements of a planet, positivists believe 
that before long humans will be able to reliably predict their own behaviour. As 
Lehrer (2010: 53) points out, if that were the case, free will, as well as God, would 
become an illusion, and we would realise that our lives are, in reality, as predict-
able as planetary orbits. However, according to the second law of thermodynamics 
(William Thomson, 1852) the universe is destined to chaos, as it suffers from a 
feverish entropy. The mistake actually lies in pretending there is order and pre-
dictability in the field of the natural sciences. As physics discovered the lack of 
determinism of the quantum world, biology has found an inexplicable disorder in 
its own heart. Life is built on an architecture of randomness. Scientific theories are 
thus functional models, but cannot be considered perfect mirrors of reality. The 
discovery of neurogenesis and of neuronal plasticity has revealed that the idea of 
a fixed deterministic order was only a mirage. The minds we inherit allow us to 
escape from our own heritage. 
Neuroscience cannot make the mistake of falling into a new mechanism. The 
most essential element of human nature is its malleability, the way each individual 
wants to change him or herself (Lehrer, 2010: 50). Regardless of any mechanism 
that could be discovered by science, freedom will always remain. The ability of the 
mind to modify itself is the source of our freedom (Lehrer, 2010: 62).
A very interesting point related to this is the theory of neurogenesis. While we 
are alive, a large proportion of the brain will be dividing itself. The brain is not 
marble, it is clay, clay that never hardens (Lehrer, 2010: 67). Neuroscience is just 
beginning to explore the deep ramifications of this discovery. The hippocampus, 
the part of the brain that modulates learning and memory, is constantly acquiring 
new neurons which help us learn and remember new ideas and behaviours. It is in 
the irrepressible plasticity of our brains where we find freedom (Lehrer, 2010: 67). 
Our nature is infinitely modified by education (Lehrer, 2010: 70). Although genes 
are responsible for the gross anatomy of the brain, our plastic neurons are designed 
to adapt to our experiences. 
It is important to take into consideration what neuroscience can offer to the 
field of “neuropeace” or to the “neural bases of conflict transformation”. We must 
remember that the analysis of the biological basis of human behaviour has been a 
classic subject of Peace Research, in the context of the debate on the existence of a 
7  Walt Whitman wrote: “Hurrah for positive science!... / Gentlemen, to you the first honors always! / Your facts are 
useful, and yet they are not my dwelling, / I but enter by them to an area of  my dwelling.” (Lehrer, 2010: 44-45).
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biological determinism that could predestine us toward violent behaviour. The re-
sults seem to indicate that there is no such determinism, a finding anthropology for 
peace and other disciplines have proven by empirical evidence (Haas, 1990; Adams, 
1992; Sponsel and Gregor, 1994; Howard Ross, 1995; Gregor, 1996; Bonta, 1996; 
Fry, 2006).
However, despite the evidence Peace Research has found to support the human 
capacity for peace, science has a tendency to adopt a violentology approach which 
seems to place the origin of selfishness, intolerance and lack of indignation in the 
biological world. In contrast to this perspective based on violentology, Philosophy 
for Peace, following the ideas of Francisco Muñoz (2001), opts for an anthropologi-
cal peaceology perspective, which is neither unilateral nor dichotomous, but aware 
of the capacity of the human being for both violence and peace, thus placing the 
analysis of violence in the sphere of freedom, responsibility and culture.
A first step will thus be the recognition of the complexity of the biological in-
heritance, devoid of any violentological bias (Muñoz, 2001). Fortunately, the latest 
neuroscientific theories have recognized the human capacity for peace and empathy 
(Rifkin, 2010). However, there is still a long way to go, not only for neuroscience, 
but also for philosophical anthropology itself. In this regard, the research of María 
Luz Pintos Peñaranda (2010), in which empathy and care are perceived as basic ele-
ments of our biological heritage, is of great interest. 
A second step in the understanding of our behaviour is the acknowledgment of 
the importance of education and culture, alongside our biological heritage (which 
cannot be disregarded either). This has been an important subject of Peace Research. 
However, while in the past, this discipline focused its debate on the biological and 
genetic basis of violence, the main subject of the debate is currently the neurological 
basis. The basic issue remains the same: does violence in human relationships have 
a biological basis—or in this case neurological? Is there a biological basis—in this 
case neurological—to the making of peace in human relationships? As for the latter 
question, all the better if this basis exists, nevertheless, the proposal is still mainly 
based on culture and social constructionism. The starting point of Philosophy for 
Peace is the need to make a normative reconstruction of our competencies and 
capacities to make peace.
The new neurological perspectives place neurological transmission and learning 
events in the framework of theories which are more favourable to sociability (mirror 
neurons), positive emotions, or moral commitments, among them the commitment 
to make peace. However, thinking that this is all there is would be another determin-
istic reduction, reducing these elements to neural events, which are neither pure nor 
neutral, and should be researched within new theoretical contexts. Thinking that 
this is all there is, would take us to a new form of dogmatism. Mirror neurons, for 
example, would be ways of explaining intersubjectivity from a neuronal perspective, 
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but they would in no way represent a “positivist verification” of intersubjectivity, 
only a different way of explaining it. Understanding it in any other way would be 
equally dogmatic, but in the opposite sense, like in the world portrayed in Skinner’s 
Walden Two, where it seemed that behavioural psychology could model people to 
make them better through stimulus-response-reinforcement processes.8 Currently, 
extensive neuropsychological research suggests the possibility of manipulating 
human behaviour through the artificial activation and deactivation of certain brain 
centres or connection systems involved in the unified functioning of the nervous 
system (Giménez Amaya and Sanchez-Migallón, 2010: 47). However, influencing 
our neuronal system (through drugs or electrical stimulation, for example) is not 
going to solve problems such as hunger or poverty, or put an end to wars. For that 
we need to resort to mutual interpellation, to learning and to the common construc-
tion of the world that we inhabit.
The evolutionary theory would suggest that if we are intelligent enough to invent 
the technology needed to increase our brain power, we should be able to use it. 
It would be the next step in the survival of the fittest. Still, we may ask ourselves: 
what would happen to the citizens of impoverished countries? Would universal 
access to this technology be guaranteed? Is it ethical to invest on the research and 
manufacture of drugs to increase memory while thousands of people are dying due 
to lack of medicines for malaria or diarrhoea? Gazzaniga believes that the increasing 
number of intelligent people will neither pose a danger nor a challenge to our values 
(2006: 94); but then again it might do so, if access to these resources and knowledge 
is not universal and is kept in the hands of 20% of the world population from the 
“developed” countries.
Finally, we would like to comment on two interesting topics regarding which 
neuroscience has offered some explanations and generated some debate, two topics 
related to the concept of the human being which could be the subject of further 
research:
a) Why does our judgement vary depending on whether a person is near or far from us?
Neuroscience has analysed the different reactions we have towards moral dilem-
mas involving the suffering of people who are close to us, and towards those involv-
ing the suffering of people who are far from us. According to a number of authors, 
at least part of the answer could lie in the most primitive operating codes of our 
brain, which we acquired throughout the evolutionary process. As said by Wilson, 
people follow codes of conduct which are very solidly anchored in the depths of our 
Palaeolithic brains (Wilson, 1993 in Cortina, 2010a). These codes, which are primar-
ily emotional, were established in the minds of individuals who lived in very small 
populations where they were necessary for survival, as they ensured mutual aid. 
8  Authors such as Gazzaniga, for example, talk about the possibility of  resorting to the findings of  reproductive 
technologies to select better and smarter embryos from the very beginning.
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Hence, in situations of physical closeness, these deep emotional moral codes of sur-
vival are activated, while, when there is no physical closeness, other colder cognitive 
codes, more detached from the immediate instinct of survival, are activated (Cor-
tina, 2010a: 137). This adaptationist interpretation could be useful to understand 
why personal and impersonal problems affect us in a different way, and it could be 
a very interesting finding for education, as it implies that children and adults should 
not be blamed for feeling more deeply affected by the problems of those who are 
close to them than by those at a distance, or for feeling safer with those they are 
familiar with than with people who are strange or different from them. Although 
we need not feel guilty about this, we should ask ourselves if the direction we want 
to follow is this, or if we prefer to nurture reason and emotions differently, for ex-
ample, by also showing appreciation for those who are far from us. If it is true that 
certain codes inscribed on our brains make us more interested in personal problems 
than in impersonal ones, if it is true that they make us react positively towards the 
people who are nearby and resemble us, and negatively towards strangers, instead 
of allowing such reactions to generate feelings of guilt, it would be better to ask 
ourselves if we want to encourage these tendencies or, on the contrary, we want to 
weaken them. Also, if that is the moral project we want to pursue or if we wish to 
take into consideration the rights of every single human being. Since feelings can be 
nurtured, cordial reason would let us nurture our reason and emotions the way we 
feel is morally better, instead of constantly lamenting our immediate reactions and 
feeling embarrassed about them (Cortina, 2010a: 138, 2011: 74-76).
b) The paradox of altruism or the logic of the sustainability of life. 
One of the greatest challenges faced by Darwin’s natural selection theory was 
the paradox of biological altruism, which was manifest in the behaviour of certain 
animals and in that of human beings. An individual behaves altruistically from a 
biological point of view when he invests his own resources to favour the adapta-
tion of another individual (Cortina, 2010a: 140). Natural selection cannot explain 
this altruistic behaviour which appears to benefit the recipient and harm the indi-
vidual that performs it, as it makes the altruistic subjects diminish their investment 
in adaptation. According to Hamilton’s research and Dawkins’s popularization 
work, it seems that biological altruism can be explained by the desire to protect 
genes. However, some actions which are costly for the individual have nothing to 
do with kinship. How can they be explained? The most plausible answer seems to 
be related to a capacity—present in humans, and perhaps also in some animals—
which is the ability to reciprocate: some altruistic actions cannot be explained by 
kinship, but by the expectation of reciprocity (Cortina, 2010a: 143-144). In Phi-
losophy for Peace we would also speak about our capacity for giving, for gratuity 
and for love. According to authors such as María Luz Pintos Peñaranda, the ethics 
of care is not an ad hoc creation derived from experience and from the legacy of 
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women, but part of our biological basis as a species. According to Marc Hauser 
(2008: 73), our moral faculties are equipped with a universal set of rules, in which 
each culture introduces certain exceptions. We want to understand the universal 
aspects of our moral judgments, as well as their variations, what makes them pos-
sible and what their limits are. As stated by Hauser, our common emotional code 
generates a common moral code (Hauser, 2008: 71). For Eskimos and some other 
cultures infanticide is lawful and justifiable when there is a scarcity of resources. 
However, for Americans it is a barbaric act. Nevertheless, parents’ duty to care for 
their children is universal in all cultures (Hauser, 2008: 73). That innate biological 
criterion, that obscure metaphysical ethic, seems to coincide with what takes us 
closer to life and keeps us away from death. And in this context a philosophy of 
care makes a great deal of sense.
2.2. Culture and Conflict
To complement what has already been said, the anthropological review pro-
posed in this section takes some of the elements peace and conflict studies have 
been working on as a starting point. The aim of this review is simply to offer a criti-
cal analysis taking into account some research lines of neuroscience, while updating 
the discussions that have been taking place in our research on peace and conflict.
In this paper we want to emphasize the image of human beings as conflictive 
beings (Muñoz, 2001), which means that one of the traits of their nature is the fact 
that they live conflicts (Comins Mingol and others, 2011; París Albert, 2009; 2010): 
human beings are conflictive because the experiencing of conflicts is inherent in their nature. We 
will therefore not fully understand what people are until we recognize this as one of 
human beings’ fundamental features.
As we are talking of conflict, we should remember its etymological definition, 
in order to know exactly what we mean by this term. The word conflict means 
“fight”, as it derives from the prefix “co-” (which means “union” or “partnership”) 
and the verb “fligere” (which means “struggle”) (Martínez Guzmán, 2005a). There-
fore, what we are saying is that “fighting with”, interacting with others to fight, 
is an essential trait of the human being. We now see the great importance of this 
capacity of interacting between people, as stated by the epistemological turn of 
Philosophy for Peace described by the unesco Chair of Philosophy for Peace at 
the Universitat Jaume I, which speaks about the importance of intersubjectivity 
(Martínez Guzmán, 2001; 2005a). Still, we must clarify that the means used for this 
interaction may be either violent or peaceful, i.e. this capacity for “fighting with” can 
come about violently or peacefully. While it is true that the verb fight could make 
us think of violence (“fighting with violence”), it is also is true that, when viewed 
from a different perspective, it can have another connotation. This verb, which 
comes from the Latin luctari and can be linked to the prepositions “to”, “against” 
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and “for”, means, on the one hand, the use of one’s own forces and resources to 
defeat another, to overcome an obstacle or to achieve something and, on the other 
hand, the reciprocal attack people perform against each other with their forces and 
weapons (Moliner, 1997). However, in a figurative sense, this “fight with, against 
and for” can refer to an individual or collective effort made  to achieve something 
without necessarily resorting to violence (Comins Mingol et al., 2011). The latter is 
the sense that we would like to emphasize, as it shows that conflicts, understood as 
a “fight with”, can be addressed through violence, but also through peaceful means. 
Again, this latter option is the one we are interested in emphasizing when it comes 
to regulating conflicts, as these are the means that better allow us to understand 
the meaning of being conflictive. And they allow us to understand it more easily 
because they prove that conflicts are not necessarily linked to violence: it is true that 
we are conflictive, but that does not mean we are violent. As we have pointed out, 
conflictivity can also be regulated by peaceful means, and this is what we should 
try to work for, what we should learn and what we should make into a habit. This 
would allow us to see conflicts as something natural, as long, of course, as they can 
be transformed peacefully.
The aforesaid conflictivity brings us to another trait of human nature, its complex-
ity (Muñoz, 2001). Complexity is closely linked to conflictivity, since acknowledging 
the complexity of human beings means recognizing they have different choices 
when handling life’s conflicts and situations. It evidences that their choices when 
facing conflicts can be based either on violence or on peace, and it also indicates 
their responsibility regarding their actions and their freedom when choosing how 
they interact with others.
Moliner (1997) gives us a definition of conflict closely linked to the ideas dis-
cussed in the previous paragraph when he says conflicts are linked to indecision. 
Conflicts are those moments when the fight is undecided; that is, those situations 
in which we do not really know what to do because they can be addressed through 
different alternative actions, which can be either violent or peaceful. We must also 
say that these interpretations are included and analysed in the Philosophy for Peace 
of the unesco Chair of Philosophy for Peace. Martínez Guzmán argues that we 
have different alternatives when it comes to doing and saying things to each other, 
and that we are the ones responsible for deciding whether we say them or do them 
through violent or peaceful means (2001; 2005a).
In order to move forward, we have to link these ideas with some of the propos-
als neuroscience could make. It would be interesting to reflect upon various ques-
tions, some of which have already been raised earlier, to give them a more detailed 
analysis. Are there any universal neural bases which allow us to speak of traits of 
conflictivity and complexity common to all human beings? Are there any universal 
neural bases that explain why different people manage their conflicts in similar ways 
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(for example, through violence)? In short, are there any universal neural bases that 
enable us to identify the biological nature of violence?
Neuroscience experts tell us that nothing happens, and nothing exists in the human 
world, which has not been previously filtered and processed by the brain (Mora, 2007: 
25). Hauser (2008: 88) states that what has allowed us to live in large groups of un-
related individuals who are continually coming and going is an evolved faculty of the 
mind which generates unconscious universal judgments on justice and prejudice. These 
quotations show us how these authors generally defend the universality of our behav-
iour, thoughts and feelings, justifying this universality by shared neural bases. Cortina 
(2011: 54) also argues that universalism is something unquestionable in the twenty-first 
century as, in her opinion, some rights (the right to life and the right to dignity, among 
others) are defended by all human beings. Nevertheless, this author also emphasizes 
the dependence of human beings on their social environment (2011: 90). Peace and 
Conflict Research, however, seems to give a lot more emphasis to the way people are 
socially constructed. That is, to the ways in which our identity is shaped in accordance to 
the learning we receive in our social environment and throughout our lives, thanks 
mainly to the education we receive both at formal, non-formal and informal levels. 
Taking this into account, Peace and Conflict Research adopts a predominantly critical 
view towards universalism, as it is true that, as Cortina (2011) says, although we have 
some common ideas about certain rights, we can still ask ourselves if the interpreta-
tion of these ideas is the same for everybody in every context. Under what rationale 
are these ideas shaped? We believe these issues and what is hereinafter discussed from 
a critical perspective is also in accordance with the research carried out by Cortina.
The questions that have just been raised are linked to two of the main grounds 
for criticism of universalism, namely: 1) It is understood that universalism implies 
the acceptance of the power of a few as a model, a form of power which is imposed 
on others. For example, male Western reason has been the universal model of rea-
son since Modernity. This is an instance of how the power of a few imposes itself 
over any other form of rationality producing the subordination of other types of 
knowledge (the knowledge of women and the knowledge of other non-Western 
cultures, for example). We can therefore say that this male Western reason has told 
us what things are like, and how they must be defined and understood; so much 
so that this form of reason has applied its interpretations to all parts of the world 
at all times in history, which is why we talk about universality. 2) It is understood 
that universalism implies a homogenization of the different forms of knowledge, to 
the extent that there is a universal reason, a knowledge of a few, which tells us how 
things are and how we should interpret them, as we already said in item one. A 
single concept of justice is thus promoted, and it aims at being universally validated 
in spite of being a construction of the Western world.
If we relate these ideas to the first two questions we have raised—are there any 
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universal neural bases that can allow us to speak of traits of conflictivity and complex-
ity common to all human beings? Are there any universal neural bases that explain 
why different people manage their conflicts in similar ways (for example, through 
violence)?—we must say that Peace and Conflict Research is unlikely to accept this 
universality. It is true that we are talking about conflictivity and complexity as traits 
shared by all human beings. Perhaps this could be a type of universality that could be 
understood from the perspective of Philosophy for Peace, since both traits could be 
considered universal characteristics shared by people across the world at all times in 
history, and perhaps it also is similar to what Cortina refers to (2011) when he speaks 
about the existence of universal rights, for example.
However, academics who do research on peace and conflicts think the ways in 
which human beings are conflictive and complex can vary between different people 
and cultures, and also depending not only on the more biological aspects that shape 
the personality and character of each person, but also on how this personality, these 
traits, and this identity are socially constructed in accordance with the formal, non-
formal and informal education this person receives. Not all people respond similarly 
to the same conflicts; responses also vary depending on our own experiences and on 
the influences we receive from our social environments. We believe this interpretation 
is in keeping with the idea we mentioned earlier, when we questioned whether the in-
terpretation of universal rights was the same for all people and in every context. As we 
have already said, we believe Cortina also shares these nuances, although she defends 
the impossibility of denying universalism in the twentieth century.
If we go back to the third question—are there any universal neural bases that 
enable us to identify the biological nature of violence?—, we start questioning the 
biological nature of violence, not only its universalism. As mentioned before, in Peace and 
Conflict Research this problem was already thoroughly studied in The Seville Statement 
on Violence: Preparing the Ground for the Construction of Peace (Adams, 1992). Philosophy for 
Peace can contribute to this debate, which we believe has a lot to do with neuroscien-
tific research, with its reflections on the existence of universal neural bases that make 
us violent. If we take into account Cortina’s (2011: 90) statement that human beings 
are clearly dependent on the social environment, and less on their genes, we will ap-
preciate better the following quotation:
es importante distinguir entre las bases de una ética universal, que serán por supuesto 
cerebrales, pero también mentales y sociales, y el fundamento de una ética universal, 
que nos permite dar razones morales ante la pregunta por el carácter exigitivo de nor-
mas, valores, sentimientos y virtudes a los que llamamos morales (Cortina, 2011: 96).9
9  «It is important to distinguish between the bases of  a universal ethic, which will of  course be neural, but also mental 
and social, and the foundation of  a universal ethic, which allows us to argue in moral terms when asked about the 
compulsory nature of  norms, values, feelings and virtues which we call moral».
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Cortina is, therefore, asking us to take into consideration the influences of social 
environment, not only the genes—which is similar to what Peace and Conflict Re-
search argues in relation to violence.
Regarding these ideas, we should point out again that Peace and Conflict Re-
search has probably been placing too much emphasis on theories based on social 
constructionism (or, at least, this is the feeling that could have derived from the 
ideas we have been discussing so far). Taking this into account, it may be appropri-
ate to mention once again that, when speaking about human beings, besides social 
constructivism (the social influences which modify and progressively shape the 
personality, the character and, ultimately, the identity of human beings), it is also 
important to take into account the most biological side of their personality, char-
acter and identity. However, in our research we will obviously give greater weight 
to the former.
Applied to the case at hand, the position expressed in the previous paragraph 
gives us the opportunity to state the following about the biological nature of vio-
lence, in accordance with the proposals Peace and Conflict Research has been work-
ing on: as human beings we have an innate capacity for violence and an innate capacity for peace. 
This does not mean we are more or less violent or peaceful by nature, it means that, 
biologically speaking, as human beings we have both innate abilities. On the other 
hand, the way in which we are socially constructed influences on whether we make 
more or less use of each one of these abilities. People can be violent or peaceful, but our 
social make-up is probably what will influence directly on our being more violent or more peace-
ful. Gazzaniga (2006: 57) defends a similar proposal when he questions the role of 
polygenetic traits as the only determinants of the human being; perhaps the genes 
can build the scaffolding for thought, but what gives rise to thinking, memory and 
other mental complexities is extremely sensitive to the environment and to the in-
teractions between the elements of such a scaffolding.
 
In short, the proposal we make from Peace and Conflict Research, in relation to 
the issues discussed in this section, can be summarized as follows:
 
1) Although conflictivity and complexity are natural features of human beings 
this does not mean we all manifest these characteristics in the same way. The ways 
in which we are conflictive and complex depend not only on the biological aspects 
of our personality and temperament, but also, and above all, on the social influences 
which progressively change our personality and temperament.
2) We cannot say all people react in the same way to conflicts, as we can respond 
to each conflict in multiple ways, and our manner of addressing them will depend 
not only on the more biological aspects of our character and personality, but also, 
and primarily, on the influences we receive from our social environment. 
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3) We cannot say we are violent or peaceful by nature. In any case, although as 
human beings we possess innate capacities both for violence and for peace, it is also 
true that the ways in which we are violent or peaceful depend mainly on how we 
are socially constructed.
4) In any case, if we can say there are universal neural bases that explain violence, 
we can also say there are universal neural bases that explain our ability to act in a 
peaceful way. Obviously, it is the latter that we are interested in emphasizing, and 
this is the reason why we strive to study and disseminate the methodologies for 
peaceful conflict transformation.
Conclusions
Neuroscience has discovered that different brain areas have specialized in dif-
ferent functions and that there are links between them. Neuroimaging techniques, 
both structural and functional MRI, allow us not only to discover the location of 
different brain activities but the activities themselves. A large proportion of neu-
roscientists present their knowledge as a new philosophy that can account for the 
functioning of morals or religion. Terms such as “neurophilosophy”, “neuroethics” 
or “neurotheology” have been coined, and these disciplines aim at studying the 
neural bases of each of these forms of knowledge and behaviour. However, it is 
important to remind the neurosciences with humanistic pretensions that they have 
several pending epistemological and ethical issues before they can fathom human 
beings in their complexity of homo (nature), sapiens (culture) and conflictive beings.
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